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Abstract
This work is inspired by the outbreak of COVID-19, and some of the chal-
lenges we have observed with gathering data about the disease. To this end,
we aim to help collect data about citizens and the disease without risking
the privacy of individuals. Specifically, we focus on how to determine the
density of the population across the country, how to trace contact between
citizens, how to determine the location of infections, and how to determine
the timeline of the spread of the disease. Our proposed methods are privacy-
preserving and rely on an app to be voluntarily installed on citizens’ smart-
phones. Thus, any individual can choose not to participate. However, the
accurateness of the methods relies on the participation of a large percentage
of the population.
Keywords: epidemic, contact tracing, privacy, location of infections
1. Introduction
When an epidemic breaks out, breaking the chain of infection is one of the
vital defends against the spread of the disease. Besides that, it is essential to
know how the population is distributed across the country at different times,
and where and when most people become infected. This kind of information
can be crucial for the authorities to plan how the society can get through the
epidemic.
In this paper, we strive to answer such questions by using the population
itself. The main idea is based on the fact that a large percentage of citizens
carry a smart-phone around with them. This smart-phone can be used to
collect and share data that can be helpful in the defeat of epidemic diseases.
At the same time, we aim to preserve the privacy of each citizen, such that
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individuals will not be forced to reveal private information. We will present
technical solutions based on cryptographic methods.
The main scenario is a country where most of the citizens carry a smart-
phone at all times. When we write that each citizen performs an action,
we mean that an app on her smart-phone does this action automatically.
Moreover, we assume there is one or two servers available that do not collude.
One could imagine that a tele-service provider/operator owns one server, and
the health-authoritie owns the other server. To this end, we assume that all
smart-phones can privately communicate with both servers. This could be
achieved using an encrypted internet connection. We assume that the servers
follow the instructions, but we do not trust them with private information.
We also assume that the users of the app (the citizens) follow instructions,
however, we do discuss how a user might cheat and suggest ways to prevent
this. In this scenario, we will consider the following challenges:
(P1) Determine the distribution of citizens in geographic locations.
(P2) Trace contacts with infected citizens. That is, how to accelerate the
process of identifying (potentially) infected people?
(P3) Determine geographic locations of infections.
(P4) Determine the time it takes for the disease to spread from one geo-
graphic location to another.
1.1. Related work
Since the outbreak of COVID-19, several research groups have been oc-
cupied with the development of technology that can aid in containing an
epidemic disease. The newly founded PEPPPT organization, [1], is develop-
ing solutions to stop the spread of COVID-19 while focusing on the privacy
and data protection laws in Europe. To date, PEPPPT has proposed a
privacy-preserving contact tracing method, which is meant to aid citizens in
finding out if they have been in contact with a person that has later tested
positive for the disease. The method is developed for application on smart-
phones. Its efficiency relies on the number of citizens that volunteer to install
the app on their smart-phone. The idea is based on random numbers being
transmitted and received by smart phones, such that random numbers trans-
mitted by a person that is later tested positive for the disease can help to
tell whom the infected person has been in contact with. Also, the work [2]
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is concerned with privacy-preserving contact tracing adhering to the privacy
laws in Europe. While they propose a decentralized solution, the underlying
idea is the same as in the work by PEPPPT. Another work that is based on
this idea is [3].
The MIT originated work in [4] is also about privacy-preserving contact
tracing; however, this method is not based on random numbers. The idea in
this work is instead based on GPS location data, such that when a person is
tested positive for the disease, redacted location data of the person can be
published, and others can see if they have made contact by comparing their
own location data. They claim that redacting the location data preserves
the privacy of the individual.
In our work, we consider a few more problems, (P1)-(P4), in addition
to contact tracing. Our method for contact tracing is built on the works
[2, 1], specifically, our contribution is a cryptographic technique on how to
strengthen the privacy preservation of the method.
1.2. Structure
In sections 2 - 5, we present our proposed methods for solving the prob-
lems (P1)-(P4), respectively. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Private Determination of the Distribution of Citizens across the
Country
The task consists of estimating the distribution of the population over a
region - a set A ⊂ R2. That is, we want to approximately determine where
citizens are located in A at a certain time; or more precisely, how many
citizens are located at different locations of A. The latter underlines the fact
that we do not seek to learn the location of individuals. To this end, we
define a partition of A as A = {Aj| j ∈ J = {1, . . . ,M}}, where M is the
number of locations, such that⋃
j∈J
Aj = A,
Ai ∩ Aj = ∅, for i 6= j.
(1)
We will use the terminology location for a set Aj ∈ A.
We propose to solve the problem by calculating the number of citizens in
each location Aj . To protect the privacy of each individual, we do not reveal
the identity of the citizens in Aj .
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2.1. Problem Formulation
Let I be an index set - the set of citizens carrying a smart-phone, and
xi ∈ A be the position of citizen i ∈ I. Consider the map P : A→ Z
M ,
P (x) = (IAj(x))j∈J , (2)
where
IAj(x) =
{
1 if x ∈ Aj
0 otherwise.
(3)
For a position x in A, P (x) delivers the information of which location
Aj ∈ A, x belongs to. For instance if x ∈ A1, P (x) = (1, 0, 0 · · · , 0). The
problem is then to calculate ∑
i∈I
P (xi), (4)
which yields the number of citizens in each location of the area. We aim to
calculate this without revealing the location of individuals.
2.2. Protocol
The main idea behind the protocol is for each citizen i ∈ I to send their
encrypted information [P (xi)] to the server, using their smart-phone. The
server should then compute
[D] =
∑
i∈I
[P (xi)], (5)
which can be done directly on the encrypted data, using for instance the
Paillier encryption scheme. There are a few challenges with the proposed
idea; 1) if M is large, i.e., A is divided into many locations, then P (xi) will
be a large vector. Thus, sending [P (xi)] might be impractical given the size
of M . 2) We want to be able to decrypt D in (5), while at the same time
ensuring that each individual term [P (xi)] cannot be decrypted. Considering
the first of these challenges, we propose a trade-off between privacy and
complexity by letting each citizen i ∈ I send only a part of P (xi) together
with the index information. That is, citizen i chooses M¯ < M indices ji ∈ J
where the index of the location she is located in is one of them, and the
indices form the vector
Ji = (j1, . . . , jM¯), (6)
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For a vector v ∈ NM¯ and the partition A, we define the map IA(v) =
(IAv1 , . . . , IAvM¯ ).
Let Pi : A→ Z
M¯ be the map defined by
Pi(x) = IA(Ji)(x).
The citizen i then sends (Ji, [Pi(xi)]) to the server. With this approach,
citizen i reveals that she is in one of the M¯ locations in Ji, thus a large M¯
gives better privacy but also more complexity.
To address the second challenge, we consider the scenario where there
are two non-colluding servers available. In this scenario, the protocol for
privately computing (4) is simple, but the privacy of the protocol relies on
trusting that the two servers do not collude. We present this protocol in
Protocol 1.
The correctness of Protocol 1 follows from the following;
D =
(∑
i∈I
y′i − s1
)
mod p
=
(∑
i∈I
P (xi) + r
′
i
)
mod p−
(∑
i∈I
r′i
)
mod p
=
∑
i∈I
P (xi) +
(∑
i∈I
r′i
)
mod p−
(∑
i∈I
r′i
)
mod p
=
∑
i∈I
P (xi),
(11)
which shows that server 2 leans the sum in (4) as required. To see that the
protocol is privacy preserving with respect to citizen i, consider the values
server 1 and server 2 receives during execution. Server 1 receives from citizen
i the data (Ji, ri), where Ji is a vector of M¯ locations and i is in one of them.
ri ∈ Fp
M¯ is a vector of uniformly random numbers giving no information to
server 1. Thus, from Ji, server 1 can with probability
1
M¯
guess the location
of i. Server 2 receives the data (Ji, yi) from citizen i and s1 from server 1.
Both yi ∈ Fp
M¯ and s1 ∈ Fp
M¯ are vectors of uniformly random numbers, thus
these give no information to server 1. Ji gives server 2 the same information
that it gave server 1. This means that the exact location citizen i is located
in, cannot be inferred from the protocol.
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Protocol 1 Determination of Distribution of Citizens
p > |I| is a prime and Fp is a finite field with p elements.
Each citizen i ∈ I does:
1: Choose Ji according to (6).
2: Choose ri ∈ Fp
M¯ uniformly at random.
3: Compute yi = (Pi(xi) + ri) mod p.
4: Send (Ji, ri) to server 1 and (Ji, yi) to server 2.
Server 1 does:
5: Compute for all i ∈ I:
r′i[Ji[k]] = ri[Ji[k]] for k = 1, . . . , M¯ , (7)
r′i[k] = 0 for k 6= Ji[h] ∀ h. (8)
where x[k] means the k’th entry in the vector x.
6: Compute
s1 =
(∑
i∈I
r′i
)
mod p.
7: Send s1 to server 2.
Server 2 does:
8: Compute
y′i[Ji[k]] = yi[Ji[k]] for k = 1, . . . , M¯ , (9)
y′i[k] = 0 for k 6= Ji[h] ∀ h. (10)
9: Compute
D =
(∑
i∈I
y′i − s1
)
mod p.
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We remark that we expect that the parties follows the instructions in the
protocol since a corrupt i could easily mess up the computation by choosing
Pi(xi) different from a standard unit vector. This means that this protocol
considers passive corruptions. However, we also notice that no information is
sent to the citizens meaning that they cannot gather additional information
about other citizens by combining their information.
Using Protocol 1, where the tele-operator takes the role of server 1 and
the health-authorities take the role of server 2, results in the latter to learn
the sum in (4), without learning the location of individuals. For learning D
at times t1, t2, . . ., Protocol 1 is simply executed at each of these times. To
this end, we remark that each citizen i ∈ I, should change Ji in (6) as little
as possible between executions, since the overlap between Ji at time t1 and
at time t2 may narrow down the possible locations of i.
3. Identification of contacts
The task is to determine if a citizen had contact with an infected citizen.
The aim of it is to warn about the possibility of being infected and advise
for self-quarantine or inform that the citizen should get tested.
3.1. Problem Formulation and Setup
We register information of a citizen i being in the vicinity (say 2 meters)
of a citizen j. If at later time (within two weeks), i is infected, we wish to
inform each citizen j that she was in the vicinity of i.
Our suggested solution to the above problem is based on an app that each
citizen can voluntarily download. The app will generate random tokens and
update these tokens frequently. The idea is that the app will send out these
tokens to all nearby phones, for instance via Bluetooth. The other citizens
will store the received tokens. If at some point, a citizen is reported infected,
the citizen can upload all its produced tokens to a server. Other citizens
can compare its received tokens to the tokens on the server, and if there are
common tokens, the citizen will learn that she has been nearby an infected
person, and hence she is notified that it is recommended that she gets tested
or self-quarantined. Similar app suggestions can also be found in [2, 3].
To discuss the setup more formally, we introduce some terminology. We
refer to the duration where the app broadcasts the same token as an epoch.
An epoch could for instance be one minute, meaning that the app updates
the broadcasting token each minute. We will also talk about the retention
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time which is the time the data needs to be stored in the phone and in the
server (this could for instance be two weeks). At last, we define the update
interval to be the number of epochs between which a citizen will compare
her set with the server’s set (this might for instance be once per day).
We also introduce some notation. We let I be defined as in section 2. Each
citizen i ∈ I stores two sets on their phone; L(i) contains all the produced
tokens by citizen i during the retention time and R(i) contains all received
tokens by nearby phones in the retention time.
If i is tested positive, it uploads L(i) to the server. We denote the set of
infected citizens by Q meaning that the server stores the random tokens in
the large set L =
⋃
i∈Q L(i).
Once per update interval, each citizen need to test whether its set of
received tokens R(i) has enough in common with the set of reported infected
tokens L. That is they need to learn some information about R(i) ∩ L.
A clever way to produce the tokens can for instance be found in [2]. We
will not go into details about the production of tokens in this work. For now,
we simply assume that the parties produce a new random token each epoch,
and thus they produce the sets R(i) and L(i). We furthermore notice that
the tokens should be deleted from R(i), L(i), and L after the retention time.
Instead of focusing on producing the tokens, we give new suggestions to
the comparison with the server each update interval. In other words, we
strive to compute information about R(i) ∩ L for each i during each update
interval in a secure way.
In other suggested protocols, the set L is send to the citizen who can
directly compute R(i) ∩ L. The advantage of this could be if additional
information about the tokens in R(i) is stored together with the token. This
could for instance be some information about the duration of contact or the
strength of the signal when they were in contact which might could be used
for calculating some probability of infection. However, we notice that even
though the citizens’ sets only include random tokens it might be possible for
the citizen to identify the tokens to specific people depending on when the
token is added to R(i) and furthermore if additional information is stored
along with the token. Hence, it might be undesirable that the citizens even
learn what the intersection is, and furthermore which tokens are included
in L since this information might reveal to them the identity of infected
citizens. So as a more privacy preserving alternative we suggest a protocol
where the citizens only learn how many tokens they have in common with
L or maybe just is notified when the cardinality of the intersection is above
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some threshold.
Our suggestion to achieve this is by using a multiparty computation pro-
tocol to compute the cardinality |R(i) ∩ L|.
3.2. Sketch of Protocols using PSI-CA
We consider the citizens i ∈ I and a server S. Each citizen holds an
R(i) and the server holds L. We want that the citizen learns if |R(i) ∩ L| is
large meaning that the citizen has a high risk of being infected. To compute
|R(i)∩L| the parties can use a secure two-party computation protocol known
as PSI-CA (private set intersection - cardinality). Informally speaking such
a protocol considers two parties, a sender and a receiver. The receiver should
learn the cardinality of the intersection and the sender should learn nothing.
More formally, the functionality for PSI-CA is presented in Functionality 1.
Functionality 1 FPSI−CA
On input a set X of cardinality n from the receiver and a set Y of
cardinality m from the sender, the functionality outputs ⊥ to the sender
and |X ∩ Y | to the receiver.
In many of the implementations of this functionality |X| and |Y | is taken
as inputs meaning that the set sizes are also revealed (or at least an upper
bound of the sizes).
Several protocols implementing the functionality in Functionality 1 can
be found in the literature, see for instance [5, 6, 7, 8]. In Protocol 2, we
give a simplified version of the protocol presented in [8] which uses what is
called a commutative encryption scheme. A commutative encryption scheme
is an encryption scheme where the encryption function Enc : M ×K → M
satisfies
Enck(Enck′(m)) = Enck′(Enck(m))
for all encryption keys k, k′ ∈ K. Such encryption schemes can for instance
be found in [9, 10]. We furthermore notice that [5, 6, 8] offer security against
semi-honest adversaries (even though some of them offers active security
against either the sender or the receiver) while [7] offers security against
malicious adversaries.
We only want to give an idea of how to securely compute the cardinality
of the intersection. Protocol 2 is presented in order for the reader to get
familiar with the ideas used in the protocols from [5, 6, 7, 8].
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We also remark that [8] uses a Bloom filter to decrease the communication
complexity but for simplicity we have left this part out.
Protocol 2 PSI-CA protocol
The receiver and the sender setup the encryption and decryption keys.
We use the notation Encr, Decr, Encs, and Decs to denote the en-
coding and decoding under the encoding/decoding keys of the receiver
and sender respectively (we remark that the encoding and decoding keys
needs not to be the same). The receiver holds X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} and
the sender holds Y = {y1, y2, . . . , ym}.
1: The receiver sends
{Encr(xi) | i = 1, 2, . . . , n}
to the sender.
2: The sender computes Encs(Encr(xi)) use a random permutation
pi : {1, 2, . . . , n} → {1, 2, . . . , n} to obtain the set
{Encs(Encr(xpi(i))) | i = 1, 2, . . . , n} (12)
and sends this set to the receiver along with the set
Y ′ = {Encs(yj) | j = 1, 2, . . . , m}
3: The receiver can use Decr on each element in the set from (12) to obtain
the set
X ′ = {Encs(xpi(i)) | i = 1, 2, . . . , n}.
4: The receiver outputs |X ′ ∩ Y ′|
To check the correctness of this protocol, denote a permutation on n
elements by pi, and notice that
X ′ = {EncS(xpi(i)) | i = 1, 2, . . . , n} = {EncS(xi) | i = 1, 2, . . . , n},
Because Encs needs to be an injective function, in order to be able to decrypt,
it follows that |X ∩ Y | = |X ′ ∩ Y ′|. The privacy of the protocol follows by
the encryption scheme.
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We now give two suggestions of how the citizens can use the FPSI−CA
functionality to check if they have been in vicinity of too many infected
persons.
Suggestion 1: The citizen takes the role of the receiver and the server
takes the role of the sender in Protocol 2. The citizen learns |R(i) ∩ L| and
if the cardinality of the intersection is large enough the citizen knows that
she needs to get tested. This description is presented in Protocol 3.
Protocol 3 Identification of Contacts – Suggestion 1
1: The citizen and the server calls the functionality FPSI−CA where the
citizen takes the role as the receiver inputting X = R(i). The server
takes the role as the sender and inputs Y = L. The functionality outputs
|R(i) ∩ L| to the citizen.
Suggestion 2: The citizen takes the role of the sender and the server
takes the role of the receiver in Protocol 2. The server learns |R(i) ∩ L| and
if |R(i) ∩ L| > t for some predetermined threshold t the server sends out a
notification to the citizen. This description is presented in Protocol 4.
Protocol 4 Identification of Contacts – Suggestion 2
1: The citizen and the server calls the functionality FPSI−CA where the
server takes the role as the receiver inputting X = L. The citizen takes
the role as the sender and inputs Y = R(i). The functionality outputs
|R(i) ∩ L| to the server.
2: If |R(i) ∩ L| > t the server sends 1 to the citizen. Otherwise it sends 0
to the citizen.
3.3. Security Advantages of using PSI-CA for Comparison
We observe that it is unavoidable that a corrupt citizen will store addi-
tional information when receiving tokens in the discussed app. In that way,
the citizen might be able to identify the received random token with some
specific person if she only received one token during an epoch. If the set held
by the server is public or sent to citizens it will be enough for the citizen to
only know which token corresponds to which person in order to learn if this
person is infected by simply comparing to the server’s set.
We avoid this in some sense by introducing the functionality FPSI−CA to
carry out this comparison. We note, however, that if we are using Suggestion
11
1 from above it is still an opportunity that a corrupt party can learn this
information using the following approach. She let R(i) contain only the single
token which she knows corresponds to the specific person. If she learns that
the intersection is 1 she has learned that the person is infected. This might
be fixed by giving restrictions on when a comparison takes place such as,
|X| > s for some s before the comparison takes place (we remark that this
seems easy to implement if we are willing to reveal |R(i)| to the server which
some of the implementations already do), or alternatively use a third party
to authorize the citizens set before comparison. There are also protocols for
authorized private set intersection cardinality in [5, 6].
However, such attacks cannot be carried out in the same way using Sug-
gestion 2 if t is at least one. In this case, the citizen will always receive 0 from
the server at the end if she is only inputting a single token. Thus, a corrupt
party needs to collect more than t different tokens from a specific person in
order to carry out such an attack and learn if another person is reported in-
fected. Furthermore, the threshold t needs not to be publicly known (in fact
it may vary depending on the recommendations by the health authorities)
but only known by the server making it more difficult for the citizen to know
exactly how many tokens she needs to collect in order to perform such an
attack.
We remark that there can be privacy concerns about learning the cardi-
nality of the intersection, meaning that there can be both advantages and
disadvantages of using Suggestion 1 or 2 corresponding to that the citizen or
the server learns |R(i) ∩ L|.
4. Determination of the location of infections
The task is to investigate if there are locations in the region A where it
is more likely that citizens get infected. For instance, does infections occur
more frequently in the local supermarket than in the church?
We propose to combine the approach in section 2 with the approach in
section 3 to determine the location of infections. To this end, we consider
the partition of A introduced in section 2 and aim to count the number of
infections in each location Aj . Since we have no demands for the partitioning
other than the ones in (1), the locations could be designed such that the
location of interest (e.g. supermarkets, churches, schools, large workplaces,
sport facilities etc.) fills up one location. In this way, our method helps
determining if certain locations are more likely to let the disease spread.
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4.1. Problem Formulation
Let Q ⊂ I be an index set - the set of infected citizens. Suppose that
citizen i ∈ I, in location Ak, has a contact with citizen j ∈ I who later
is tested positive for the disease. If i afterwards is also tested positive, we
assume that she was infected by j in location Ak. Potentially, i can have
been in contact with other infected citizens in locations Ak′, in which case
we choose to view each distinct Ak′ as a potential infection site and therefore
count in each of them. In continuation, we define the set Ai consisting of
the indices k of locations Ak, where i has been in contact with an infected
citizen. To this end, we denote by v(Ai) ∈ Z
M the vector with entries
vh(Ai) =
{
1 if h ∈ Ai
0 otherwise,
(13)
where vh(Ai) is the h’th entry of the vector v(Ai). The problem is then to
calculate
Y =
∑
i∈Q
v(Ai). (14)
4.2. Protocol
We propose to combine the solution to (P1) and (P2). That is, we
assume that each citizen i stores the sets L(i) and R(i), which are introduced
in section 3. Furthermore, we introduce a third set RA(i) that keeps track of
which location Ak citizen i was located in when receiving the token r ∈ R(i).
Specifically, RA(i) is the set consisting of the pairs (r, Ak), for all tokens
r received by i. To this end, we propose that if citizen i is tested positive
for the disease, both L(i) and RA(i) is uploaded to the server. This will
reveal the locations of where citizen i has been in contact with other citizens,
which does leak some private information about i. However, by designing
the locations Ak such that locations consisting of residences are large and
places of interest are small, we believe that it will not be possible to infer the
identity of i from L(i) and RA(i).
The server can then check whether any tokens r received by i in location
Ak is in L, which would imply that i was infected by the citizen transmitting
r ∈ L in location Ak. If multiple tokens r
′ ∈ RA(i) is in L and all is
received in distinct locations, we do not know where i was infected, but each
of the corresponding locations is a potential infection site. Hence, we propose
13
Protocol 5 Location of Infections – Suggestion 1
Each citizen i ∈ I does:
1: For each received token, i attach the location Ak of where the token was
received, and creates the set RA(i).
2: If citizen i is tested positive for the disease, both L(i) and RA(i) is
uploaded to the server.
The server does:
3: For all i ∈ Q, compute the set
Ai = {k | ∃(r, Ak) ∈ RA(i) and r ∈ L}
4: Compute
Y =
∑
i∈Q
v(Ai). (15)
to count all locations as a possible infection site. The proposed method is
formally presented in Protocol 5.
The correctness of Protocol 5 is straight forward, as the server directly
computes the desired sum from (14). To see that the protocol preserves the
privacy of citizen i, consider L(i) and RA(i) received by the server from
citizen i ∈ Q. The former is a set of uniformly random numbers, thus these
cannot give the server any direct information. However, if the server also
receives L(j) and RA(j) from a citizen j ∈ Q and a token r in (r, Ak) ∈ RA(j)
is also in L(i), then the server knows that i and j has been in contact in
location Ak. However, this is exactly the information we want the server
to learn, to be able to determine the location of infections. Thus, we view
it as unavoidable that the server learns this. Moreover, we must keep in
mind that the server only learns this information from citizens i, j ∈ Q, i.e.,
citizens who are infected.
From RA(i) the server learns the location of where i has made contact
with another citizen. Hence, the server learns some of the locations i has
been in during the retention time. However, if the locations are designed such
that places where only a few people are located are large and places where
many people comes and goes are smaller, then the possibility of inferring the
identity of citizen i from RA(i) is small.
As an alternative to Protocol 5 we also present Protocol 6. The concept of
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this protocol is similar. However, when i is reported infected she only sends
RA(i) to the server. The server then needs to call a private set intersection
functionality, see Functionality 2 for a definition, with citizen i in order to
learn L(i) ∩ R. This is the tokens infected persons have received from i,
meaning that i has been in contact with an infected citizen when this token
was sent. After the server has learned the intersection it can search for the
tokens in RA to find the corresponding locations.
In this way Protocol 6 is maybe more privacy preserving with respect
to the citizens since they only needs to send one of the sets. However, it
is probably also more communication consuming since the server and the
citizen needs to carry out the intersection in a secure way and the server
cannot compute it local.
Functionality 2 FPSI
On input a set X of cardinality n from the receiver and a set Y of
cardinality m from the sender, the functionality outputs ⊥ to the sender
and X ∩ Y to the receiver.
Protocol 6 Location of Infections – Suggestion 2
Each citizen i ∈ I does:
1: For each received token, i attach the location Ak of where the token was
received, and creates the set RA(i).
2: If citizen i is tested positive for the disease, it uploads RA(i) to the
server. Furthermore, it engage in FPSI inputting L(i) with the server.
The server does:
3: The server inputs R =
⋃
i∈QR(i) to FPSI and receives L(i) ∩R.
4: For all i ∈ Q, compute the set
Ai = {k | ∃(r, Ak) ∈ RA and r ∈ L(i) ∩ R}
5: Compute
Y =
∑
i∈Q
v(Ai). (16)
As a remark, we notice that we can interchange the roles of R(i) and L(i)
meaning that it does not matter to which of the sets we attach the location.
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Thus, in Protocol 6 we could instead have let the citizens produce LA(i) and
send these to the server. The server then stores LA =
⋃
i∈Q LA(i) and inputs
L to FPSI which reveal R(i) ∩ L to the server. This modification makes it
very similar to Protocol 4 where the server learnt |R(i) ∩ L|.
5. Determination of the time it takes for the disease to spread
The question is to establish the timeline of how the disease moves across
infection sites. For instance, if a substantial amount of infections has occurred
in a certain city, how much time does it take before there also is a large
amount of infections in the neighboring city.
We will again use the locations Ak of the area A, defined in section 2.
Thus, we seek to determine the number of infections in each location Ak at
each time step. This data serves as a timeline of how the disease spreads
across the country.
5.1. Problem Formulation
The problem turns out to be very similar to (P3), which is solved in sec-
tion 4. Hence, we use the notation introduced in this section and additionally
introduce the index set T = {t0, t1, t2, . . .} being the set of time steps where
it is desired to measure the evolution of the disease. We denote the set of
infected citizens between the time step th−1 ∈ T and time step th ∈ T by
Qth .
The task is then to calculate the number of infections occurring in each
location in the time intervals, i.e.
Yth =
∑
i∈Qth
v(Ai), (17)
5.2. Protocol
We propose to use Protocol 5 or Protocol 6 to calculate (17) with the
distinction that the server must keep track of the time it receives L(i) and
RA(i) for i ∈ Q. In this way, the server can produce Yth for each h = 1, 2, . . ..
We write the protocol in Protocol 7 where we have used Protocol 5 as our
starting point.
That Protocol 7 is correct and privacy preserving follows since Protocol 5
is.
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Protocol 7 Time and Location of Infections
Each citizen i ∈ I does:
1: i does the same steps as she does in Protocol 5.
The server does:
2: Upon receiving L(i) and RA(i) between time step th−1 and th, add i to
Qth .
3: For all i ∈ Qth , compute the set
Ai = {k | ∃(r, Ak) ∈ RA(i) and r ∈ L}
4: Compute at each time th ∈ T
Yth =
∑
i∈Qth
v(Ai). (18)
6. Conclusion
The paper presents privacy preserving methods for answering questions
related to the behavior of citizens during an epidemic and related to the
spread of the disease. Our methods are based on the observation that a large
percentage of the population in most countries carries a smart-phone. To
this end, the efficiency of our methods relies on the willingness of citizens to
install and use these app-based methods.
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